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THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM IN JURISPRUDENCE: A NEW CASE FOR SKEPTICISM
For more than two hundred years, legal philosophers have been preoccupied with specifying the differences between two systems of normative guidance that are omnipresent in all modern human societies: law and morality. In the last hundred years, what I will call the "Demarcation Problem"-the problem of how to distinguish these two normative systems-has been the dominant problem in jurisprudence and legal positivism has offered the most important solution. Positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and
Raz claim that the legal validity of a norm can not depend on its being morally valid, either in all or at least some possible legal systems (the range of the scope operator here marks the distinction between "Hard" and "Soft" versions of positivism).
Kelsen tells us on the first page of the Pure Theory that the theory "attempts to
answer the question what and how the law is, not how it ought to be" 1 and the second chapter on "Law and Morals" sets out to establish that the "science of law"-the science of the legal validity of norms-is not to be confused with "ethics," the science of the social norms denominated "moral" (59). " [L] aw and morals" must be "recognized as different kinds of normative systems" (62), Kelsen says, a difference he locates in the fact that law involves "a socially organized coercive" sanction, while morals lacks such sanctions, substituting "merely the approval of the norm-conforming and the disapproval of the norm-opposing behavior" (62).
The first sentence of The Concept of Law states Hart"s aim "to further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related phenomena" (vi).
He famously identifies as one of the three main issues driving jurisprudential inquiry the question, "How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral obligation?" (13). That issue looms so large because "law and morals share a vocabulary so that there are both legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights" and "all legal municipal legal systems reproduce the substance of certain fundamental moral requirements" (7). This, of course, leads positivism"s most important competitor, natural law theory, to claim "that law is best understood as a "branch" of morality or justice."
Positivists, of course, deny this. Finally, and as is well-known, Hart devotes an entire chapter of The Concept of Law to the relationship between "Law and Morals," noting that positivists deny that "the criteria of legal validity of particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly if not explicitly, a reference to morality or justice" (185) and that, in consequence, "it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so" (185-186).
Raz, similarly, devotes fully half of his classic collection of essays, The Authority of Law, to "criticiz[ing] various attempts to establish a conceptual connection between law and morality" (x) and the seminal chapter on "Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law" makes clear that the identification of law "is a matter of social fact" that is independent of its "moral merit" (37). rests, some do not. Because human ends and purposes shift, the concept of a "chair" has no essential attributes. Now the question of whether an artifact concept has an extension that can be picked out in terms of necessary and essential properties is not one unfamiliar to twentieth-century philosophy: far from it. Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Carl Hempel, to name three luminaries of 20 th -century philosophy, were interested in a version of the Demarcation Problem-not how to demarcate law from morality, to be sure, but how to demarcate epistemically reliable forms of inquiry from epistemically unreliable ones, that is, how to demarcate science from pseudo-science or nonsense. Like the legal philosophers, they sought to identify the essential properties of a human artifact (namely, science). They failed, and spectacularly so. Perhaps there is a lesson for legal philosophers in this story.
In philosophy of science, the Demarcation Problem was the problem of figuring out which kinds of human inquiry were epistemically special, that is, which had epistemic properties or characteristics that warranted the inference that the conclusions of such inquiry were likely to be true. Those epistemically special forms of inquiry were to be deemed scientific, and so deserving of credence, while all others were not. Permit me to quote from Larry Laudan"s seminal treatment of the rise and fall of the Demarcation Problem, 7 which he characterizes as follows:
[W]e expect a demarcation criterion to identify the epistemic or methodological Attempts to solve the scientific Demarcation Problem were, in turn, precisely efforts to specify the "conditions which are both necessary and sufficient" for some form of inquiry to be scientific (Laudan, p. 119).
The history of the search for such a criterion is quite a long one, going back to antiquity (though the artifact concept Aristotle wanted to understand is different than ours, not surprisingly) (Laudan, the labeling of a certain activity as "scientific" or "unscientific" has social and political ramifications which go well beyond the taxonomic task of sorting beliefs into two piles….Precisely because a demarcation criterion will serve as a rationale for taking a number of practical actions which may well have far-reaching moral, social and economic consequences, it would be wise to insist that the arguments in favor of any demarcation criterion we intend to take seriously should be especially compelling. (120) In other words, the Demarcation Problem was thought to matter because knowledge by simply dividing forms of inquiry into the "scientific" and "non-scientific" based on some necessary and essential properties distinguishing the two forms of inquiry.
So what then about the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence? I do not need to rehearse for this audience the doubts about the positivist analysis of law, the most powerful and successful analysis of law we have. Many of these doubts may be, as I am inclined to think, misguided, yet who can deny that there are genuinely hard cases for the positivist to explain? Hart says that the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for a legal system require that citizens generally obey the valid primary rules and that the officials of the system accept the secondary rules of the system from an "internal point of view," that is, they view them as imposing obligations upon them. Can there not then be a legal system in which the officials are motivated by merely self-interested concerns, e.g., they
enforce the secondary rules because it advances their professional career or spares them from political retribution? Can the idea of a rule of recognition really account for the reasoning of common-law courts interpreting precedents? Hart says the "rule of recognition" is merely a social rule, so its content is fixed by whatever the practice of officials in a particular legal system happens to be. Raz says the practice can not include appeal to moral criteria of legal validity consistent with the law"s claim to authority.
Shapiro says it can not include such appeals consistent with the law"s claim to guide conduct. Waluchow argues the law"s claim to authority is compatible with an official practice of employing moral criteria of legal validity if authoritative directives are merely weighty, rather than exclusionary, reasons for action. And so on.
If, in the history of philosophy, there is not a single successful analysis of the "necessary" or "essential" properties of a human artifact, why should we think law will be different? If hundreds, perhaps thousands, of philosophers in the last century--both the innovators like Carnap and Popper, and the legions of less well-known philosophical laborers-could not specify the essential and necessary features of science, perhaps the most important and transformative human artifact of recorded history, should we really hold out hope that an analysis of law will yield "necessary" and "essential" criteria?
A skeptical induction over past failure is not a conclusive refutation, just as the failure to solve the Demarcation Problem in philosophy of science does not prove that there is no account of the essential and necessary properties of an inquiry that is scientific. But, rather than belabor the no-doubt familiar disputes about the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence, let us follow Laudan"s lead and ask a different question:
namely, why does solving this problem matter?
In surveying the writings of the great writers on the Demarcation Problem in jurisprudence-I here mean Kelsen, Hart, and Raz-it seems that two practical concerns explain the importance for these writers, and those who follow them, of demarcating legal from moral norms 10 :
(1) First, the fact that a norm is legally valid does not mean it is morally obligatory.
(2) Second, the fact that a decision by a legal official would be morally attractive does not mean it is legally obligatory.
In other words, legal positivists-those who have insisted that the Demarcation Problem can be solved-are keen to emphasize that legality does not entail morality and, conversely, that morality does not entail legality. You will notice, of course, that the 10 I do not mean to deny that these writers also have a purely theoretical concern, i.e., figuring out what they take to be true of the concept of law. But since there is no reason to think this is a sensible theoretical project-unless ethnographically and temporally bounded in ways that are not obvious congenial to their original ambitions--it is important to focus on its import for practical reasoning. Kelsen and Hart, as everyone knows, were both metaphysical anti-realists about moral norms: that is, they denied that such norms had any objective existence, they psychological behaviorism) that our best theory of the world will quantify over psychological states and persons, but it will not quantify over moral norms, 12 and so we need to approach the Demarcation Problem in that spirit.
If we understand the idea of the morally obligatory or morally attractive in purely psychologistic terms-which is precisely how Hart should ( Hitler"s ascent to power" (p. 658) and concludes that, due to the ideas of legal positivism, the "German lawyer was therefore peculiarly prepared to accept as "law" anything that called itself by that name" (p. 659), even, of course, when the law was morally abhorrent.
Fuller"s attack has been criticized for its misstatements of Hart"s views, such as claiming that Hart believes there is an "amoral datum called law, which has the peculiar quality of creating a moral duty to obey it" (p. 656). That Hart"s version of the positivist Thesis on Feuerbach, let me suggest that a "dispute…that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question." I can see why Kelsen, Hart, and Raz might have thought that a solution to the Demarcation Problem was both possible and might be relevant to practice. I think we no longer have an excuse for believing this today.
